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the action in his own name.' And after notice to the debtor, of the
assignment, the assignee's rights become so far fixed that no subsequent transactions between the assignor and creditor will be
permitted to affect them, and therefore a release or other discharge
obtained from the assignor, will be treated as a nullity.'

In an

action brought in the name of the assignor, to enforce the contract,
the assignee is the only party actually interested, and the assignor
has no real rights whatever. He cannot interfere with the progress of the suit, nor prevent judgment being entered for the
plaintiff, and the actual dismissal of the suit by him will be no
bar to a subsequent action,3 nor will the court permit such discontinuance to be effected by him. ' And the defendant in any action
may set-off any debts due" from the plaintiff to third persons, which
have been assigned to him, whether those debts are simple contract
debts, or evidenced by sealed instruments.5 In short, the old rule,
good in times past, but the reason for which has now passed away,
is nothing but a shadow of its former self, the substance of which is
6
ontirely departed.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of
Michigan. July Term, 1860.
JOSHUA FITCH vs. LAWRENCE REMER ET AL.
1. A mortgage was executed to secure to the plaintiff a loan for two thousand dollars on real estatb in Michigan, with ten per cent, interest, payable semi-annually, in New York; the loan to be paid in six years.
'Mowry vs. Todd, 12 Mass. 281; Crocker vs. Whiting, 10 Mass. 316.
Andrews vs. Beecher, 1 Johns. Cases, 411; Littlefield vs. Story, 3 Johns. 426;
Legh vs. Legh, 1 Bos. & Pull. 447; Raymond vs. Squire, 11 Johns. 47.
3 Mandeville vs. Welch, 5 Wheaton, 277 ; 1 Wheaton, 230.
4 McCullum vs. Cox, I Dallas, 139.
5 Cowply vs. Alden, 2 Bay, 481 ; Tuttle vs. Beebe, 8 Johns. 166.
6 See remarks of Buller, J., 4 Term Reps. 340.
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2. In New York, if more than seven per cent. interest be stipulated for, it is usurious, and the instrument is void.
3. In Michigan, the legal rate of interest is fixed at ten per cent., and a higher rate
of interest is not recoverable, though agreed to be paid.
4. Suit was brought on the mortgage, and the court held, that the plaintiff, a citizen of New York, was entitled to a judgment on the mortgage, with ten per cent.
interest, the legal rate of interest in Michigan.

Mr. Duffleld, for the plaintiff.
Mr. Lathrop, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McLEAN, J.-This bill was filed to foreclose a mortgage. When
the mortgage was executed, Fitch resided in New York, the defendants in the State of Michigan. On the first of January, 1850, the
complainant loaned to the defendants two thousand dollars, for
which the defendants executed a bond and mortgage on land in
Michigan for the payment of the loan. The sum loaned was to be
paid in January, 1856, to the complainant, at his residence in the
State of New York, and also to pay at his residence in New York,
ten per cent. per annum on the loan semi-annually.
In New York the legal interest is seven per cent. per annum,
and any per cent. above that sum is usurious, and the instrument is
declared to be void. In Michigan there is no penalty for usury,
the excess over the legal rate, only, is recoverable.
It is agreed that this proceeding to enforce these securities must
be under the laws of New York or the laws of Michigan, whichever
shall be held to be the law of the contract. This is the only question in the case, there being no dispute about the facts.
The general rule is, that the contract, in respect to its construction and force, is to be governed by the law of the country or State
in which it is to be executed. 2 Kent's Comm. 459; Story's Conflict of Laws, § 242. In Beimsdqlk vs. Kane et al., 1 Gallison, 374,
Judge Story says the rule is well settled, "that the law of the place
where a contract is made is to govern as to the nature, validity and
construction of such contract," unless it shall appear from the tenor
of such contract, it was entered into with a view to the laws of
some other State; Slacum vs. Pomery, 6 Cranch, 221, as where a
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negotiable note was endorsed in a State different from that in which
it was made. Lord Mansfield, in Robinson vs. Bland, 2 Burr.
1077, says, "The law of the place can never be the rule where the
transaction is entered into with an express view to the law of another
country; and that was the case with the contract in that cause."
And Kent, Ch. J., 1 Johns. 92, said, "The force and effect of the
contract must be determined from the contract itself, and not by
proof aliunde."
Huberus, in his De Conflictu Legua, vol. 2, book 1, tit. 3, says,
"The general rule is, that contracts are to be interpreted according to
the laws of the country where they are made; but if, from the terms or
nature of the contract, it appears it was to be executed in a foreign country, or that the parties had respect to the laws of another country, then
the place of making the contract becomes immaterial, and the obligation must be tested by the laws of the country where the duty was to
be performed. In Ohampantvs. Lord Ranclagh, it was decided that
a bond executed in England, and made payable in Ireland, carries
Irish interest, where no interest was mentioned. -Fanningvs. Consequa, 17 Johns. 518. In Robinson vs. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, a bill
of exchange drawn in France for money lent there, and made payable in England, was deemed a contract subject to the laws of
England, and to bear English interest. In Thompson vs. Ketchum,
4 Johns. 285, a note was drawn in Jamaica, made payable in New
York, and the Supreme Court of New York followed the same rule.
In Smith vs. Smith, 2 Johns. 235; Ruggles vs. Ruler, 3 Johns. 263 ;
-Emoryvs. Grenough, 3 Dal. 369; and Vanshaic vs. Edwards, 2
Johnson's Cases, 355, the same doctrine was carried out.
A contract is to be construed by the law under which it was made,
but if entered into to be performed in another State or place, it is
to be treated, generally, as to its force and effect, by the laws of the
latter place; and it will be good or bad according to the laws of
such place. To this there is an exception in regard to official bonds,
taken in pursuance of an act of Congress, which are not subject to
the local law, but are assumed to have been executed at the seat of
the federal government. (ox vs. U. States, 6 Peters, 203. The
cases of Andrews vs. Pond, 13 Peters, 77; Bell vs. Bruin, 1 How.
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182; 9 Howard, 277; Tanning vs. Conse qua, 17 Johns. 511; 3
Johns. 263; 4 Johns. 285; 9 Cushing, 46; Story's Conflict of Laws,
§ 280; Story on Bills, § 147; Robinson vs. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077.
Under the principles laid down in the above authorities, it is
insisted that the instrument before us is a New York contract, and
that the agreement to pay more than seven per cent. interest is
usurious and void; and as the contract binds the defendant to pay
to the plaintiff, in New York, interest at the rate of ten per cent.
per annum, semi-annually, and the loan at the end of six years,
presents the argument with great force against the legal rights of
the plaintiff; and this contract, it is urged, is to be governed by the
law of the place of performance, and whatever shall be a good defence there shall be good everywhere. This doctrine is laid down
in Story's Conflict of Laws, §§ 331, 305, and Story on Bills of Exchange, § 161. And it is admitted, that where a contract is made
in one place, payable in another, without fixing the rate of interest,
such rate is determined generally by the laws of the latter place.
Scofield & Taylor vs. Day & Gaiston, 20 Johns. 102; De Wolf vs.
Johnson, 10 Wheat. 10; Henly vs. Gorman, 3 Green, 328.
And it is admitted by the highest authority, that any interest
may be lawfully stipulated for, not exceeding the law of the place
where the instrument is payable. Andrews vs. Pond, 13 Peters,
77; Thompson vs. Ketchum, 4 Johns. 285; .Robb vs. Halsey, 11
Smedes & Marshall, 146.
These concentrated authorities seem to cover the whole ground
of controversy, leaving but little for doubt or speculation. Principles are sometimes evolved from the exigencies of society, and
grow into favor from their adaptation to the fitness of things. No
one can say that both the common and civil law have not been
ameliorated and improved by such means. But we are to look to
established principles and not to theories in considering the case
before us.
The debt is founded upon a bond and mortgage for the payment
of two thousand dollars, executed on land in Michigan by the defendant to the plaintiff, a citizen of New York, payable in five
years at the rate of ten per cent. per annum semi-annually, on the
42
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first days of July and January, to the plaintiff, at his residence in
New York.
In 2 Kent's Com. 460, it is said: "If, however, the rate of interest be specified in the contract, and it be according to the law of
the 1lace where the contract was made, though that rate be higher
than is lawful by the law of the place where payment was to be
made, the specified rate of interest at the place of the contract will
be allowed by the courts of justice in that place; for that is part of
the substance of the contract." The general doctrine is, " that the
law of the place where the contract is made is to determine the rate
of interest when the contract specifically gives interest; and this
will be the case though the loan be secured by a mortgage on lands
in another State, unless there be circumstances to show that the
parties had in view the laws of the latter place in respect to interest.
When that is the case, the rate of interest of the place of payment
is to govern." De Wof vs. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 867; Quince vs.
Callander, 1 Desaus. 160.
"With respect to the question of usury, in order to hold the contract to be usurious it must appear that it was made here, and
that the consideration for it was to be paid here. It should appear,
at least, that the payment was not to be made abroad; for if it was
to be made abroad, it would not be usurious." 2 Simons, 211.
In reference to the above cited case, Chancellor Kent says, vol. 2,
of his Com. 461: "So also, according to the case of Thompson
vs. Powles, it would seem to be now the received doctrine at Westminster Hall, that the rate of interest on loans was to be governed
by the law of the place where the money was to be used or paid,
or to which the loan had reference; and that a contract made in
London to pay in America, at a rate of interest exceeding the
lawful interest in England, was, not a usurious contract, for the
stipulated interest was parcel of the contract." This appears to
be a liberal relaxation of the rigor of the former rule in the
English courts, and it is conformable to the American cases. Story's
Conf. of Laws, § 305.
In the somewhat noted case of Depau vs. Humphreys, 20 Martin,
1, the note was given in New Orleans, payable in New York, for
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a large sum of money, bearing an interest of ten per cent., being the
legal interest in Louisiana, the New York legal interest being seven
per cent. only. The question was, whether the note was tainted with
usury, as it would be, if made in New York. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana decided that it was not usurious; and that although
the note was made payable at New York, yet the interest might be
stipulated for either, according to the law of Louisiana or according
to that of New York. To the same import are the cases of Peck
vs. Mayo, 14 Verm. 33; and Chapman vs. Bobertson, 6 Paige,
627. Redfield, Oh. Justice, says, "it is well settled, if a contract be
entered into in one place to be performed in another, and the rate
of interest differ in the two countries, the parties may stipulate for
the rate of interest in either country." In Pratt vs. Adams, 7
Paige, 615, the court say, "if the contract was not illegal by the laws
of the country where it was made, and the money was loaned, the
fact that the drafts were payable in New York would not render
them void under the usury laws; except in a case where the loan
of money out of this State was a mere device to evade the operations
of the law of this State which was intended as a cover for usury."
The doctrine is well established, if a mortgage be executed in Michigan, which is the domicil of the mortgagor, at the legal rate of
interest, full effect will be given to the security, without reference
to the usury laws of any other State, which neither party intended
to violate. In Andrews vs. Pond, 13 Peters, 78, the court say,
"the general principle in relation to contracts made in one place
to be executed in another, is well settled. They are to be governed
by the law of the place of performance; and if the interest allowed
by the laws of the place of performance is higher than that permitted at the place of the contract, the parties may stipulate for
the higher interest without incurring the penalties of usury."
By the statute of Michigan, ten per cent. was the legal rate of
interest, and this was the amount stipulated to be paid, and constituted a part of the contract; the court cannot presume, therefore,
against the fact, that usury under the New York statute was intended.
In Ohio Insurance Company vs. Edmonson, 5 Louis. 295, 299,
300, the court say, "by the comity of nations a practice has been
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adopted, by which courts of justice examine into, and enforce contracts made in other States, and carry them into effect according to
the laws of the place where the transaction took its rise. This
practice has become so general in modern times, that it may be
almoft stated to be now a rule of international law, and it is subject
only to the exception, that the contract, to which aid is required,
should not, either in itself or in the means used to give it effect,
work an injury to the inhabitants of the country where it is attempted
to be enforced." Story's Conflict of Laws, §244.
In Chapman vs. Robertson, 6 Paige 627, 630, 633, the court
said, "I have arrived at the conclusion, that this mortgage, executed here, and upon property in this State (New York,) being valid
by the lex situs, which is also the law of the domicil of the mortgagor, it is by the execution of the mortgage upon the land here."
"If no place of payment is prescribed, the contract takes effect.
as a contract of the place where it is made; and being payable generally, it is payable every where, and after a demand and refusal of
payment, interest will be allowed according to the law of the place
of the contract. But if the place of payment or of performance is
different from that of the contract, then the interest may be validly
contracted for at any rate not exceeding that which is allowed in the
place of payment or performance." Story's Conflict of Laws, § 305.
"Whether a contract is usurious or not, depends, not upon the
rate of.interest allowed, but upon the validity of that interest in the
country where the contract is made, and is to be executed. A contract made in England for advances to be made at Gibraltar, at a
rate of interest beyond that of England, would nevertheless, be valid
in England; and so a contract to allow interest upon credits given
in Gibraltar at such higher rates would be valid in favor of the
English creditor. Story's Confl. of Laws 458-9, 3d Ed.
In his Conflict of Laws, 488, Mr. Justice Story says, "Bo u llnais
has no where directly and positively treated the question, whether
the interest may be stipulated for according to the place of the contract, where payment is to be made in another place where it would
be illegal." In page 492, he says, "if the transaction is bona fide,
and not with intent to evade the law against usury, and the law of
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the place of performance allows a higher rate of interest than that
permitted in the place of the contract, the parties may lawfully
stipulate for the higher rate of interest." No one ever doubted this.
The daily experience of every business man kiows, that a note is
legal, if given for a rate of interest fixed by law in any State where
it is payable. In Michigan, ten per cent. is the legal rate of interest,
and may be recovered.
Mr. Justice Story objects to the principle here laid down, and
there is no jurist in America or in England, of higher authority.
He admits in See. 299, that the phrase lex loci contractus may have
a double meaning or aspect; and, that it may indifferently indicate
where the contract is actually made, or where it is virtually made,
according to the intent of the parties, that is, the place of payment
or performance. And he says, "we have seen, that the rule of the
civil law clearly indicates this."
No one can suppose that a contract can be distributed into parts,
and so made good for the whole, but that the clear intention of the
parties may be understood and applied; as where the legal rate of
interest stipulated to be paid is higher where the contract is entered
into, than the place of payment, the higher rate may be presumed
to be within the intention of the parties.
If the transaction is bona fide and not with intent to evade the
law against usury, and the law of the place of performance allows a
higher rate of interest than that permitted at the place of the contract, the parties may lawfully stipulate for the higher interest
But then the transaction must be bona fide, and not intended as a
mere cover for usury. Andrews vs. Pond, 13 Peters, 65. "Mr.
Chancellor Kent," says Mr. Justice Story, "has correctly laid down
the modern doctrine ; and he is fully borne out by the authorities.
'The law of the place,' says, he, ' where the contract is made, is to
determine the rate of interest, when the contract specifically gives
interest; and this will be the case, though the loan be secured by
a mortgage on lands in another State, unless there be circumstances
to show that the parties had in view the law of the latter place in
respect to interest. When that is the case, the rate of interest of
the place of payment is to govern.'" 2 Kent, 891, 460, 8 edit,
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De Wolf vs. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 367 ; Scofield vs. Day, 20 Johns.
102; Thompson vs. Powles, 2 Simon, 194.
It is agreed that the above loan was made in this manner:
"An agent of the complainant, Mr. Loomis, residing in St. Clair
county, drew a draft on the complainant, caused the same to be
cashed at a bank in the city of Detroit, and paid the proceeds
over to said Remer, at said St. Clair; the bond and mortgage were
executed at St. Clair, on real estate in said county of St. Clair,
and delivered to said Loomis at that place, as the agent of complainant."
It is also agreed, that by the laws of the State of New York,
in force at the time of making said loan, and ever since in force,
the taking more than seveh per centum per annum upon any loan
of* money was prohibited, and any contract or security made or
taken in violation thereof, was by such laws void.
Now, that this was a perfectly fair transaction, understood by
the parties, no one can question. The contract was valid under
the laws of Michigan, unaffected by any taint of usury. No deception was practiced. The contract can be legally enforced in Michigan; and this suit is now brought to enforce it. There is not a
circumstance to show that the parties had in view any other rate
of interest than that which was stipulated in the contract. And
if that rate of interest cannot be recovered under the laws of
New York, no one doubts that it may be recovered in the State of
Michigan, where the contract was made. In Andrews vs. Pond,
13 Peters, 65, 77, 78, the Supreme Court says: "If the interest
allowed by the laws of the place of performance is higher than that
permitted at the place of the contract, the parties may stipulate
for the higher rate of interest without incurring the penalties of
usury. And the court say, taking eight per cent. in Alabama is
no violation of the New York law."
The bond and mortgage are valid under the Michigan law, and
the plaintiff elects, as he has a right to do, that he will proceed under the Michigan statute. And it is difficult to perceive on what
ground the defendant can complain that his rights are affected by
the usury law of New York. The ten per cent. interest which the
,defendant agreed to pay, was a part of the contract, authorized by
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the laws of Michigan, and this contract is not supposed to be impaired by an agreement to pay the same rate of interest in New
York. The mortgagee claims the ten per cent. interest, under the
Michigan law, and this he is entitled to.

In the United States Circuit Court, Mobile, June 30, 1860.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. JOHN H. HAUN.

1. An indictment under the sixth section of the act of Congress of April 20, 1818,
for the suppression of the African slave trade, can be sustained against" one who

holds, sells, or disposes of an African illegally brought into the country from
any foreign kingdom, place or country, or from sea, no less than against any
person who shall illegally bring such African into the country.
2. The word "or" in this statute is not to be construed "and."
3. Property in persons entering the United States with their own consent, and
mingling with property and persons in the States, in some manner and to some
extent fall under State authority, and in some manner and to some extent are

not subject to federal control, but the case is otherwise with regard to property
imported contrary to law or smuggled, or persens imported against their will.
4. Some account of the Federal Slave laws, and their history.

J.-This indictment contains three counts, and charges
that the defendant held, sold and disposed of, in this district,
negroes, as slaves, illegally imported into the United States in 1859,
from a foreign place, by some person unknown.
The District Attorney, in moving for process for the arrest of the
defendant, suggested that the opinion had been expressed upon a
similar indictment in this court, by my colleague, the Judge of the
District Court, that the offence charged did not subject the defendant to a criminal prosecution, and that if that opinion was concurred in by the presiding judge, process ought not to issue. My
colleague of the District Court was of counsel for this defendant
before his appointment to the bench, and does not sit in this case.
I have considered the subject with care, and shall proceed to express
my opinion at large, in consequence of the importance of the subject and the condition of opinion in this tribunal.
CAMPBELL,
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The indictment must be supported under the sixth section of the
act of 20th April, 1818, for the suppression of the African slave
trade. The section is, "If any person or persons whatsoever shall,
from and after the passage of this act, bring within the jurisdiction
of the United States, in any manner whatsoever, from any foreign
kingdom, place, or country, or from sea, or shall hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of any such negro, mulatto, or person of color so brought
in, as a slave, or to be held to service or labor, or be in anywise
aiding or abetting therein, every person so offending shall, on conviction thereof by due course of law, forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding ten thousand dollars, nor less than one thousand dollars,
one moiety to the use of the United States and the other to the
person or persons who shall sue for such forfeiture and prosecute
the same to effect; and, moreover, shall suffer imprisonment for a
term not exceeding seven years, nor less than three years."
The object of this section of the act was to prevent the introduction of persons who, for the purpose of this discussion I will denominate Africans, and their employment, sale, or other disposition
as slaves within the United States. This introduction or use is made
penal, however, or by whomsoever made. By the language of the
section, the act of importation and the acts of holding, selling, or
disposing of the African, the subject of importation, are distinct
offences. It is, "if any person," "shall bring," "in any manner" from abroad, "or shall hold, sell, or dispose of any negro so
brought in" as a slave. Neither is it necessary that the offenders
under the one clause shall be in any relation of accessories or accomplices under the other clauses of the act. " Every person aiding or abetting" in either of the criminal acts, is denounced as
criminal in the degree of his principal,.by its plain language. The
manifest import of this section of the act is, that if any person shall
import an African, as a slave, into the United States from abroad,
(i. e. foreign kingdom, place, or country, or by sea,) or be in anywise
concerned therewith, or shall hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of as
a slave, an African, being illegally imported, he shall suffer the
penalties prescribed. Now, upon this construction of this section
of the act there is charged against this defendant acts that are
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criminal, and which subject him properly to a presentment of the
grand jury. But it is said that the act must be limited to such as
were concerned with the importation, and that a proprietor by purchase ex post facto, is not embraced within the terms of this section
of the act. An analysis of the section shows that "if any person
or persons whatsoever" "shall bring within the jurisdiction of the
United States" any African as a slave, "or be in anywise aiding or
abetting therein," "or shall hold, sell, or dispose of such African
as a slave, or be in anywise aiding or abetting therein, every person
so offending shall forfeit and pay," &c. To justify the argument
relied on, the word AND should be substituted for the word OR, and
the act should read, If any person shall bring within the jurisdiction of the United States, AND shall hold, sell, or dispose of any
African as a slave. But the exigency must be imperious which
will justify this court to take such a license with an act of Congress
as to substitute the one word for the other.
This section was reported in the form in which it stands (in so
far as this question is concerned) from a committee of the senate,
was considered by both houses of congress, and amended in other
particulars, and became the law of the land by the concurrence of
congress and the president. The intention of congress must be
very clearly contrary to the langnage of the act to authorize so
important a change in the signification of the words employed.
But a change of the word or to and would leave the importer and
his accessories guiltless, unless there was some holding or other act
of dominion subsequently. A sale of the cargo, before the importation, accompanied by delivery, without more afterward, would be
unprovided for in this section of the act. But the whole series of
the slave trade acts show that the simple act of importation was
regarded by congress as a high misdemeanor. The fifth section
declares that neither the importers nor any person claiming from
or under them, shall hold any right, interest, or title whatsoever in,
or to any negro, mulatto or person of color, nor to the service or
labor thereof, who may be imported or brought into the United
States in violation of the provisions of this act. The sixth section,
previously quoted, provides for the punishment of the importer,--
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he who brings within the jurisdiction of the United States the
African-and for the punishment of those who hold any right or
title under him; that is, those who hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of
the African imported. This section is the vindicatory complement
of the fifth section. The importer and those who hold, sell, or
otherwise dispose of the African, and their accomplices, comprise
all who contribute to foster or encourage the prohibited traffic.
And this conclusion is corroborated by the eighth section of the
act. This is, that "in all prosecutions under this act, the defendant shall be holden to prove that the negro, mulatto, or person of
color, which he shall be charged with having brought into the
United States, or with purchasing, holding, selling, or otherwise
disposing of, and which according to the evidence in such case, the
said defendant shall have brought in aforesaid, was brought into
the United States at leastfive years-previous to the commencement
of this prosecution, or was not brought in, holden, purchased, or
otherwise disposed of contrary to the provisions of this act. Congress, by this section, imposes upon all persons the obligation to
make a diligent inquiry into the integrity of every right or interest, asserted or exercised over the person of an African before
acquiring it. They evidently infer that but few, if any, derivative
claims to Africans, illegally imported, would be bona fide, and that
every holder, vendor, or employer of such persons, would be conscious 6f the infirmity of their estate, and therefore of their criminality under the laws of the United States. The slave trade at the
date of the act of 1818 had been prohibited ten years.
It was a rational hypothesis, that those Africans, who were then
in the United States, might be easily discriminated from those who
might be imported illegally afterwards: The African is a rational
being, and may communicate to- an interested inquirer the conditions under which he came from his native continent. If this was
not an unreasonable hypothesis in 1818, it is an assured fact now.
The African, legally imported prior to 1818, and residing in the
United States since that date, must be readily distinguished from
the African imported in 1859. The importer, or the most casual
inquirer, must be able to say of the latter class, "surely thoii art
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one of them; for thy speech betrayeth thee." Before leaving this
part of the inquiry, I will examine the seventh section of this act,
as it is intimately connected with this subject. This section is,
"if any person or persons whatsoever shall hold, purchase, sell, or
otherwise dispose of any negro, mulatto, or person of color, for a
slave, or to be held to service or labor, who shall have been imported
or brought, in any way, from any foreign kingdom, place or
country, or from the dominions of any foreign State immediately
adjoining to the United States, into any port or place within the
jurisdiction of the United States, every person so offending, and
every person aiding or abetting therein, shall severally forfeit and
pay for every negro, mulatto, or person of color so held, purchased,
sold or disposed of, one thousand dollars, one moiety to the United
States, and the other to the person or persons who may sue for
such forfeiture and prosecute the same to effect, and to stand committed until the same is paid." It is assumed that all persons
holding, purchasing, selling or disposing of an imported African, as
a slave, without reference to the place whence imported, is comprehended in this section, and that its operation is not limited to
Africans imported from territories adjoining the United States.
For the purpose of this discussion, I shall concede this. It will be
perceived, then, that the words employed in this section embrace
a portion of the same acts that are included in the sixth section,
and that other offences are embraced, which makes the seventh section a complement of the sixth section-the two sections embracing
every case of title derived from an illegal importation. The sixth
section provides for the punishment of an importer from a foreign
kingdom, place, or country, and from sea, and the seventh adds
the dominions of a foreign State adjacent to the United States.
The two sections embrace the same offence of holding, selling, or
disposing of slaves. The penalties are dissimilar, and the mode of
their recovery is different. The penalties of the sixth section can
attach only after the presentment of a grand jury; those of the
seventh may be recovered in an action of debt. The questions
arise upon the view of the act I have been taking, whether the
penalties are cumulative or alternative, or must we find some dis-
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tinct subject upon which each shall have a distinct operation, and
is this distinct subject to be attained by changing a word in the
act of congress for one of a different meaning? It is not important
to settle whether the penalties are cumulative or alternative. The
latter inquiries are the only ones of importance in this case. I have
before stated there is no ambiguity in the language of the act.
The doubt, if one exists, originates in the uncommon fact that there
are apparently distinct penalties, differing in degree and mode of
prosecution, for the same offence. That double penalties will not
be inferred from equivocal words, is admitted, and that the rules of
interpretation discourage implications favorable to them.
But this rule is subordinate to that primary rule that directs us
to find in the plain language of the legislature their purpose.
Now, the act under consideration, and statutes of a similar nature, furnish instances of congressional legislation, in which double,
cumulative and alternative penalties are inflicted against the same
person for the same act. United States vs. Sixty-seven packages,
17 How. 85.
The several sections of this act exhibit a forfeiture of the ship
built and equipped for, or employed in, the slave -trade, and the
owners, builders, and persons manning, or loading, or interested in
the importation, are punished with fine and imprisonment. These
various penalties may, in supposable cases, all overtake the same
offender.
This proves that congress were aware of the difficulty of detecting and convicting the persons engaged in this trade, and have
sedulously and ingeniously legislated to enlist the cupidity of detectives and informers to aid the moral sense and public spirit of
the country to bring them to justice, But if the seventh section
were construed as applying only to importations from States or
dominions adjacent to the United States, and the sixth section to
places more remote, there would be a distinct field for the operation of the sixth and seventh sections, and there would be no question concerning double penalties. I leave that part of the act open
until a case shall arise for judgment.
The circumstances accompanying the enactment of the act of
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1818 may be considered in ascertaining the policy of Congress on
the subject. Congress were informed that the slave trade was
vigorously prosecuted by citizens of the United States, and particularly through the Spanish settlements of Florida and Texas, and
that Africans, to the number of thousands, had been illegally imported into the United States. The correspondence of the Collector
of the Port of New Orleans, (Mr. Chew,) with the Treasury Department, was placed before Congress, in which the names of planters,
probably connected with the importation of slaves, may be found.
Mr. Forsyth, of Georgia, in a report from the Committee on
Foreign Relations, informed Congress: "The experience of ten
years has evinced the necessity of some new regulations being
adopted in order effectually to put a stop to the further introduction
of slaves into the United States. In the act of Congress prohibiting this importation, the policy of giving the whole forfeiture of
vessel and goods to the United States, and no part thereof to the
informer, may justly be doubted. This is an oversight which should
be remedied. The act does, indeed, give a part of the personal
penalties to the informer, but these penalties are generally only
nominal, as the persons engaged in such traffic are usually poor.
The omission of the States to pass acts to meet the act of Congress,
can only be remedied by Congress legislating directly upon the subject themselves, as it is clearly within the scope of their constitutional power so to do." Congress, thus counselled, employed committees, who carefully revised the acts of 1807 for the same object,
amplified its scope, and increased its penal provisions, and their bill
was, after proper deliberation and some amendment, adopted, and
forms the act of 20th April, 1818.
When I consider the mischief to be removed, the variety of sentiment to be addressed to secure co-operation for that object, the
subtle artifices employed to evade the laws, and the difficulty experienced in their enforcement, I am not able to say that the variety
of the penalties and of the modes of pursuit and prosecution creates
surprise. It is evident that Congress did not discover any great
difference in the misdemeanor of the different persons who might be
concerned in the importation or holding of Africans illegally intro-
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duced into the country, and considering this opinion, the design
they wished to accomplish, and the embarrassments in the way of its
accomplishment, I find myself quite unable to discover that incompatibility in their enactments and sound principles of legislation, that
shouldt lead me to do violence to their language to set them aright.
Regarding the language of the act of 1818 alone, myopinion is, that
the indictment charges an indictable offence against the defendant.
But another rule is invoked which is entitled to consideration.
It is said that the power of Congress is limited to a cognizance
of the acts of the importer, and those concerned with him. That
Africans, whether considered as persons or as property, after they
come within the jurisdiction and limits of a State, cease to
be under the dominion of the federal authority. They are no
longer subject to the commercial power of Congress which alone
applies to the subject, and the crime of holding them as slaves is a
State, not a federal crime. The cases of Brown vs. Maryland,12
Wheat. 488; Norris vs. City of Boston, 7 How. 283, and the
popular opinion and judgment on the alien law of 1798, are supposed to confirm this opinion. It may be admitted that property or
persons introduced or entering She United States by their consent,
and mingling with property and persons in the States, in some manner and to some extent, fall under State authority, and in some manner and to some extent, are not subject to federal control. The
decision of Brown vs. Maryland was a case of property legally introduced through the custom-house of the United States. The
Supreme Court of the United States held that it was not subject to
State taxation until it had ceased to exist as in the condition of an
import, and had not become confused or mingled with the common
property of the State. The case of Norris vs. City of Boston
recognized a similar limitation on State authority as to persons, and
that passengers on a foreign ship could not be taxed by State
authority until they were fairly separated from the ship and voyage.
But these cases only prove when State authority may begin to
operate, and not when the federal authority terminates, upon property
or persons legally introduced into the country. But suppose the
case of merchandise imported contrary to law, or smuggled, would
it be contended that the federal authority was at an end when the
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property became mingled with the property of the State, and bad
gone into the hands of bona fide purchasers ? This is not an open
question. In The United States vs. 1,960 Bags of Coffee, 8 Or.
398, the claimants alleged, and the demurrer of the United States
admitted, that the coffee was regularly entered and the duties secured,
and that they were bona fide purchasers of it for value. The Supreme
Court said: "We are of opinion that the question rests altogether
on the wording of the Act of Congress, by which it is expressly
declared that the forfeiture shall take place upon the commission of
the offence." If the phraseology were such as in the opinion of a
majority of the court to admit of doubt, it would then be proper to
resort to analogy, and the doctrine of forfeiture at common law, to
assist the mind in coming to a conclusion. The court declare the
power of Congress over the subject in the following impressive language: "In the eternal struggle between the avarice, enterprise
and combinations of individuals on the one hand, and the power
charged with the administration of laws on the other, severe laws
are rendered necessary to enable the executive to carry into effect
the measures of policy adopted by the legislature. To them belongs
the right to decide on what event a divesture of right shall take
place, whether on the commission of the offence, the seizure, or the
condemnation." Other cases of a similar nature have arisen, in
which acts of Congress have been interpreted as establishing the
one or the other period when the forfeiture attached, and in no case
has the authority of Congress to legislate been disputed. U. S. vs.
Grundy, 3 Cr. 337; U. S. vs. Caldwell, 8 How. 367. The power
of Congress to provide for the seizure and removal of persons coming
to the country illegally and without their consent, has been asserted
as fully in judicial decisions as it has been in regard to property.
The most-signal instance of this arises under the extradition laws
and treaties requiring the surrender of a fugitive from the justice of
foreign nations. Metzer's case, 5 How. 176; In re Kaine, 14
How. 103. In Holmes vs. Jennison, 14 Peters, 540-570, the
chief justice says: "All the powers which relate to our foreign
intercourse are confided to the federal government. Congress have
the power to regulate commerce; to define and punish piracies
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and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the
law of nations; to declare war; to grant letters of marque and
reprisal ; to raise and support armies ; to provide and maintain a
navy ; and the president is not only authorized, by and with the
consent of the senate, to make treaties, but he also nominates, and
by and with the consent of the senate, appoints ambassadors and
other public ministers, through whose agency negotiations are to
be made and treaties concluded. He also receives ambassadors
sent from foreign countries ; and everything that concerns our
foreign relations, that may be used to preserve peace or wage war,
has been committed to the hands of the federal government. The
power of deciding whether a fugitive from a foreign nation should
or should not be surrendered, was necessarily a part of the powers
granted." It would seem to follow irresistibly, that if congress
might provide for the arrest and removal of foreigners who had
evaded the justice of a foreign nation, by flight to the United
States, notwithstanding his domicil within any of the States, they
might provide for the removal of those who had been imported, or
had entered the United States contrary to their own laws, and
that State authority could afford such a person a. sanctuary or
shelter. Nor do I perceive any contradiction of this conclusion in
any of the opinions in the passenger cases, nor is it opposed to
the opinion of any accredited tribunal, political or judicial, on the
alien law of 1798. The complaint against the alien law was, that
it authorized the president to remove from the country a foreigner
legally domiciled in the United States, and belonging to a nation
with which the United States were at peace, upon an opinion that
he was dangerous to the government, without an accusation under
oath, or affording him the opportunity of making a defence. The
case before the court is one in which the power of congress to pass
laws to prohibit the importation of Africans, or slaves, cannot be
denied. The subject entered into the debates of the continental
congress, and forms one of the compromises on which the constitution rests. Under the constitution the "migration or importation
of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited (by congress) prior to the
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year 1808." On the first day of the year 1808, by an act of
congress made to meet the approach of their plenary authority, the
importation of Africans as slaves, or the purchasing of them from
the importer, became illegal. In 1814, in the treaty of peace
negotiated at Ghent with Great Britain, the trade was declared to
be " contrary to humanity and justice," and an obligation was then
entered into to discourage it. The act of 1818 was subsequently
passed, and the more severe act of May 1820 completed their
penal legislation on the subject. No system of measures exists in
our legislation that has been more carefully considered, or which
obtained more completely the deliberate, impartial and conscientious approbation of States and statesmen. It requires no small
measure of moral and intellectual intrepidity to impugn them.
A few have expressed the opinion that the power of congress was
derived only from their control over foreign commerce. But in
the early debates in congress this was denied, and it was said
" that a reference to the constitution would expose the fallacy."
Among the powers delegated by that instrument to congress, was
the power to define and punish offences against the law of nations.
It was afterwards added that the migration or importation of such
persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to
admit, shall not be prohibited prior to 1808, but a tax or duty may
be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
person. Before 1808 this last provision would expire, and the first
provision would be reinstated in full efficacy, which unquestionably
gave congress a fall power over the subject, independently of that
derived from their right to regulate commerce.
Unquestionably, President Jefferson, when he congratulated congress at the approach of the period at which they might interpose
their authority constitutionally to withdraw the citizens of the
United States from all further violations of human rights which
have been so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of
Africa, and which the morality, the reputation and the best interests
of our country have been long eager to proscribe, supposed that
something beyond a regulation of commerce was concerned in the
action to be taken. President Madison in accepting, and the senate
43
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of the United States in unanimously ratifying the treaty of Ghent,
before mentioned, probably agreed with the argument I have quoted.
The act of May, 1820, declaring the slave trade by American citizens to be piracy, and the treaty of Washington of 1842, in which
the United States agreed with Great Britain to unite in all becoming representations and remonstrances with any and all powers
within whose dominions such markets (markets for Africans) are
allowed to exist, and that they will urge upon all such powers the
propriety and duty of closing such markets effectually, at once and
forever evidently imply that the suppression of the slave trade has
become a part of the domain of international law, and belongs to
the jurisdiction of congress as a part of that foreign intercourse of
the Union which is submitted to its exclusive control. I do not
consider this question of any importance in the solution of the present inquiry, for, considered merely as a commerce that the congress may suppress or prevent,-.they are clothed with powers adeThey are not
quate to the accomplishment of their policy.
dependent upon the State governments for ancillary legislation, nor
can they be obstructed by their inaction or opposition. " N o trace,"
say the Supreme Court of the United States, "no trace is to be
found in the constitution of an intention to create a dependence of
the government of the Union on those of the States, for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate to
its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the
accomplishment of its ends. To impose on it the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot control, which another government
may furnish or withhold, would render its course pernicious, the
result of its measures uncertain, and create dependence on other
governments, which might disappoint its most important designs,
and is incompatible with the language of the constitution." 4 Wheat.
816, 424. No more striking illustration of the force and accuracy
of this opinion of the Supreme Court can be adduced than might
be afforded by the concession that the power of congress over the
slave trade terminates after the introduction and sale of the Africans in the States. The slave trade might be as a matter of fact
reopened, by the neglect or refusal of a State to enact or enforce
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prohibitory laws; for it can hardly be supposed that every port and
inlet of the United States will always be properly guarded, so as to
prevent their introduction and sale.
The expectations of the States which framed the Constitution,
and stipulated that after 1808 congress might abolish the trade at
once and forever : the solemn treaties, binding the nation to employ
moral and material force to effect throughout the world the closing
of slave markets for Africans forever: the acts of congress prohibiting the trade, and confiscating the implements and machines
employed in it, as if they were accomplices in the guilt-acts passed
with unanimity, and sanctioned by an approving people, might be
frustrated and defeated if the African could be held, sold, or otherwise disposed of, without responsibility to those in whom the Constitution has conferred the power of making these laws and treaties.
No such consequences can follow. The Constitution has not left
the power of the federal government to employ the means requisite
to fulfil its obligations, and to execute its authority to cavil or question. It confers upon congress the power "To make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution
in the government of the United States, or in any department or
officer thereof." The power to inflict punishment for the infraction
of laws is incidental to the power of making laws. This is the usual
as it is the appropriate means, by which a government secures
obedience, and upon this foundation the criminal jurisdiction of the
United States reposes. Before the enactments under consideration
had been made, philosophic and practical statesmen had discovered
"that the true origin of the slave trade was not in the place it was
begun at, but at the place of its final destination." If there were
not men who held, sold, or otherwise disposed of Africans, after the
termination of the slave voyage, and the act of importation completed, there would be no building, equipping and manning of ships,
no voyages to the African coast for slaves, no barracoons to supply
American vessels, no piratical seizures, no confinements or detentions of Africans as slaves, no mortuary lists of the victims of such
acts to startle and shock humanity, no need of African squadrons,
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or slave trade treaties, no illegal entries or importations. A complete preventive of the holding, selling or disposing of Africans
within the limits of the United States, or by the citizens thereof,
would remove the stain which has fallen upon our country by the
abuse of its flag. This legislation of congress, then strikes at the
root of this evil. If enforced it would extirpate a large share of
the mischief. Such being the case, I am unable to bring myself to
the conclusion that the means congress have selected by imposing
penalties upon an offender against their laws are not necessary and
proper to the end. I cannot assent to the conclusion, that they
cannot execute their obligations to suppress a trade which they have
declared to be contrary to humanity and justice, by punishing the
citizens who hold and dispose of the subjects of that trade anywhere
within their jurisdiction.
After the act of 1807 had been passed, an apprehension was expressed, that the 8th section of that act applied as well to domestic
slaves as to slaves imported contrary to law; a committee was raised
to inquire of the subject, and Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, reported an explanatory bill. It is, that "whereas doubts have arisen,
or may arise, touching the construction of the 8th section of the
act of which this is explanatory, and whereas, congress disclaim
and disavow all constitutional authority whatsoever, by any legislative act, in anywise to abridge, modify, or affect the right of property
of masters of slaves not imported into the United States contrary
to law, in and to such slaves; be it enacted," &c. &c. The bill proceeds to declare that the act of 1807 shall be construed according to
the principle announced in the preamble, and that no fine or penalty
or forfeiture should be incurred in reference to any act prohibited
in the 8th section, except in respect to slaves imported contrary to
law.
This report seems to draw the line between federal and State
jurisdictions with exactness. The power of congress to enforce their
laws in respect to slaves imported contrary to their policy, and in
violation of their enactments was not disputed, while the authority
to interfere with domestic slavery, legally existing in the States,
was disavowed and disclaimed in this report. And it cannot be
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doubted that this was the sense of Congress, although it adjourned
-without acting upon this bill. I have declared that the offence
created by the sixth section of the act is an indictable offence.
The sixth section provides that on conviction, by due course of law,
the offender shall forfeit and pay for every such offence a sum not
exceeding ten thousand dollars, nor less than one thousand dollars;
and moreover shall suffer imprisonment for a term not exceeding
seven years, nor less than three years. Within the limits assigned,
it is clear that the court would determine the fine and imprisonment,
and if there were nothing more in the act, that an indictment would
be a proper mode of prosecution. But the same section contains a
clause that distributes "one moiety of the fine to the use of the
United States, and the other moiety to the use of the person or
persons who shall sue for such forfeiture and prosecute the same to
effect." But the mode of suit or prosecution is not explicitly declared, nor is any limitation imposed upon the United States to proceed by action of debt or case, or by information. Nor is the interposition of an informer indispensable to the prosecution. The
United Stites may proceed on the information of its own functionaries. The punishment attached to a conviction for this offence
places it in the grade of offences for the robbery of the mail, 'when
the life of the courier is not threatened, and stealing of the mail;
of the offences of being accessories after the fact to murder, and
piracy on the high seas, and the embezzlement of public property
and misprison of felony. The constitutional, safe, regular and usual
method of proceeding against such offenders is by indictment or
presentment of a grand jury, and I should require words of explicit
direction, before I should feel authorized in saying that congress had
prescribed a different method. The distribution of the penalty follows the conviction, and can be as well done after a criminal prosecution as a civil action. It would be a strange anomaly in the course
of procedure in the courts of the United States that would terminate in a judgment of fine and imprisonment upon an action of debt
or case. I think I am hardly justified by any rule for the judicial
interpretation of statutes in pronouncing tha t the terms employed in
this section of the act were designed to make so grave an alteration
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in the law of criminal procedure. The rights and interests of the
accused are promoted by adhering to that system which is preferred
by the constitution, and has been consecrated by usage.
I have thus exhibited my views upon this statute and upon the
considerations that have been opposed to them. Ihave stated upon
different occasions here, and in other courts of this circuit, the opinions that are here examined. The indictments returned in this and
other cases in this court, and in other courts of this circuit, were
found by the grand jury in accordance with them. Regarding this
act as within the competency of congress, my duty is performed,
when I have ascertained their meaning, and declare it, whenever a
question is raised in a case at law upon it. This I have done in
this case.
. The order of the court is, that process issue to the marshals of
the State of Mississippi, as well as to the marshal of this district,
for the arrest of the accused.

In the Supreme Judicial Court of Afa8achu8etts, 1860.
COMMONWEALTH VS. )RA TEMPLE.
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1. All'public easements are under the power of the Legislature, exercising the
sovereign power of the State.
2. The rights of the public in a highway are equal, but each person must use it with
a just regard to the rights of others.
3. Every grant carries with it all incidental rights and powers necessary to the full
and beneficial enjoyment of the grant.
4. Hence, where a heavily loaded team was on the public street, in which was laid,
and in public use, a horse railroad, one of the wheels of the team being on the
railroad track, and the team moving at the usual rate of speed of such teams, but
at a less rate of speed than the horse car, and the teamster was asked to remove
his team from the horse railroad, but did not; it is an obstruction of the public
travel, and unlawful, and a violation of the public right, and indictable.
I We acknowledge our obligations to both the Chief Justice and the Reporter, for
this valuable and interesting case.-Eds. Am. Law Bey.
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Indictment on § 5 of the statute of 1856, chapter 302, entitled
"An Act to incorporate the Malden and Melrose Railroad Company," which provided as follows:
"If any person shall wilfully and: maliciously obstruct said corporation in the use of said road or tracks, or the passing of the cars
or carriages of said corporation thereon, such person, and all who
shall be aiding or abetting therein, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding five hundred dollars, or may be imprisoned in the common
jail for a period not exceeding three months."
At the trial in the Court of Common Pleas, it appeared from the
evidence on the part of the commonwealth, that the defendant was
driving his heavily loaded wagon from Charlestown to Boston in a
public street, with one wheel in the track of the Middlesex Railroad,
when one of the cars of the Malden and Melrose Railroad came up
behind him. The defendant's team was moving at the usual rate
for teams of that class, but at a less rate of speed than the horse
cars were in the habit of moving. There was room outside the
track for either vehicle to pass the other. When the cars came up
the conductor asked the defendant if he would please to remove his
team from the track. The defendant did not, but continued upon
it at the same rate of speed several hundred feet, and then turned
off. It also appeared from the same testimony that it was usual for
those in charge of vehicles like that of defendant to drive them with
one wheel in the track, and that they could be drawn much more
easily in that place than in any other part of the street. There
was no evidence that the defendant got upon the track in the first
instance with the intention of obstructing the cars, or that he
changed his rate of speed on the approach of the cars, or that he
used the street, or did any act in any other than the usual manner.
There was no other evidence than this bearing upon the question of
malice. As bearing upon the question of intention, the defendant
offered to show that it is not the custom for those in charge of vehicles to turn out when a car comes up behind them, until it suits
their convenience. The evidence was objected to, and ruled out.
The defendant contended that malice must be shown, and that it
could not "e inferred from the mere fact that the defendant used a
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part of the street the most convenient to him in the ordinary way,
knowing that the car would be obstructed by such use.
The defendant also prayed for the following instructions:
1. If the jury find that the defendant was using the highway in
the ordinary way, they must find for the defendant, without reference to the motive of his act.
2. In the absence of regulations on the subject, the corporation
has no right to drive its cars at any particular rate of speed, and
the mere slacking of the speed of the car by the defendant, if it was
moving at the ordinary and proper rate of speed, was no obstruction within the meaning of the statute.
3. There is not sufficient evidence to warrant the jury to find a
verdict of guilty.
.4. The right of the horse railroad company to
use the highways
is subject to the right of the public to use such highways as they
had previously done.
5. If the jury find that the defendant went upon the track in the
ordinary use of the street, without intending to obstruct the car,
and continued on the track after the car. came up behind him for
his own convenience, and because that was the best part of the
street to drive on, the defendant is not guilty.
6. In order to establish the crime of obstructing the cars, some
act must be shown besides the use of the street in the ordinary way.
7. The act incorporating the railway company created no new
crime; it merely attached a new penalty.
8. In the absence of regulations as to the rate of speed, and the
mode of use of the track, they have no right to any given rate of
speed.
The presiding judge (Bishop, J.) declined to give any of the instructions, as prayed for, but did instruct the jury, that although the
public might drive their vehicles over the tracks of the railroad when
the cars were not approaching, the corporation had a prior right to
the track; and if the jury should find that the defendant was on the
track, and hindered the progress of the car, and was requested to
remove from it, and could reasonably have removed, he was bound
so to do; and his remaining there, knowing that the car would be
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thereby obstructed, intending thereby to obstruct it, in the use of
their track, was a wilful and malicious obstruction within the meaning of the statute, and that it was not material whether the defendant stopped his vehicle, or whether it continued to move on the
track at the ordinary rate of such vehicles; that no other proof of
malice was necessary than that the defendant knowingly and intentionally obstructed the car, although he may have made only the
ordinary use of the street.
To all of these rulings and instructions, and refusals to instruct.
the defendant alleged exceptions.
P. TV. 6hanler and G. O. Shattuck, for the defendant.
S. J. Phillips, A. G., for the Commonwealth.
SHAW, C. J.-Since horse railroads are becoming frequent in and
about Boston, and are likely to become common in other parts of
the Commonwealth, it is very important that the rights and duties
of all persons in the community, having any relations with them,
should be distinctly known and understood, in order to accomplish
all the benefits, and, as far as practicable, avoid the inconveniences,
arising from their use. This is important to proprietors and grantees of the franchise, who expend their capital in providing a public
accommodation, on the faith of enjoying with reasonable certainty
the compensation in tolls and fares which the law assures to them ;
to all mayors, aldermen, selectmen, commissioners or surveyors
specially appointed by. law for the care and superintendence of
streets and highways; to all persons for whose accommodation in
the carriage of their persons and property these ways are specially
designed; and to all persons having occasion to use the ways
through or across which these horse railroad cars may have occasion to pass. These railroads being of recent origin, few cases
have arisen to require judicial consideration, and no series of adjudicated cases can be resorted to as precedents to solve the various
new questions to which they may give rise.
But it is ihe great merit of the common law, that is founded upon
a comparatvely few, broad, general principles of justice, fitness,
and expcdi-:-cy, the correctness of which is generally acknowledged,
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and which at first are few and simple; but which, carried out in
their practical details, and adapted to extremely complicated cases
of fact, give rise to many, and often perplexing questions; yet
these original principles remain fixed, and are generally comprehensive enough to adapt themselves to new institutions and conditions of society, new modes of commerce, new usages and practices, as the progress of society in the advancement of civilization
may require.
In the first place, all public easements, all accommodations intended for the common and general benefit, whatever may be their
nature and character, are under the control and regulation of the
legislature, exercising the sovereign power of the State, either by
general law or special enactment. It may be done by a charter or
special act of incorporation, in case of a bridge over broad navigable
waters ; or, where the necessity for its exercise is of frequent recurrence, it may be by the delegati6n of power to special tribunals,
or municipal governments, by general laws.
Again; when the entire public, each according to his own exigencies, has the right to the use of the highway, in the absence of
any special regulation by law, the right of each is equal; but as
two or more cannot occupy the same place at the same time with
their persons, their horses, carriages and teams, or other things necessary to their use, each is bound to a reasonable exercise of his
absolute right in subordination to a like reasonable use of all others;
and not to incumber it over a larger space, or for a longer time, to
the damage of any other, than is reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of his own right. If an adjacent proprietor has
occasion to stop at his own gate with a carriage or team, if he has
occasion to deliver wood, coal, or other necessaries, or, if he is a
trader, to deliver or receive merchandise, he must place his team or
carriage, for the time being, in such manner as to obstruct the way
for the use of others as little as is reasonably practicable, and remove the obstruction within reasonable time, to be determined by
all the circumstances of the case.
So in the actual use of the highway. Each may use it to his
own best advantage, but with a just regard to the like right of
others. Persons in light -carriages, for the conveyance of persons

COMMONWEALTH vs. TEMPLE.

only, have occasion, and of course a right, when not expressly
limited by law, to travel at a high rate of speed, so that they do
not endanger others. But all foot passengers, including aged persons, women and children, have an equal right to cross the streets,
and all drivers of teams and carriages are bound to respect their
rights, and regulate their speed and movements in such a manner
as not to violate the rights of such passengers. So in regard to
drivers of fast and slow carriages, each must respect the rights of
the other. Take a single illustration: if a heavily loaded ox-team
be passing along a street wide enough for only one carriage, say
fourteen feet, and other fast carriages follow, these last must, for
the time being, be restrained to their speed, because this necessity
results from these circumstances,-the narrowness of the way, and
the ordinary slowness of the ox-team ahead. If parties thus travelling in the same direction should come to a portion of the way
wide enough for carriages to pass each other, say twenty feet wide,
it is obvious that if the driver of the heavy team would turn to
either side, it would give the fast team room to pass, whereas, if he
should keep the middle, the five or six feet on either side would not
permit any carriage to pass. Now, supposing no impediment should
intervene, and no circumstance should render it dangerous for the
driver of the slow team to bear off, in our opinion it would be his
duty to do so, although it might suit his convenience better to keep
in the middle; and his refusal thus to bear off would be an abuse
of his own equal and common right, for which, if injurious to another, an action would lie; and, if it was a public highway, the
party would subject himself to a public prosecution.
In some few cases, the regulation of the use of the highway is
important enough to require a rule of positive law, requiring each
traveller, when meeting, to turn to the right of the centre ; in some
States to the left. But the circumstances under which travellers
may be placed in relation to each other, are so various, that it would
be impracticable to prescribe any positive rule approaching nearer
to certainty than the rule of the common law, that each shall reasonably use his own right in subordination to the like reasonable
use of all others.
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With these views of the law regulating the use of public ways, we
will examine the present case, as it appears on the exceptions.
We understand that a horse railroad and cars are a modern invention, designed for the carriage of passengers, and, though not
moving with the speed of steam cars, yet with the average speed
of coaches, omnibuses, and all carriages designed for the conveyance of persons.
The accommodation of travellers, of all who have occasion to use
them, at certain -rates of fare, is the leading object and public benefit
for which these special modes of using the highway are granted, and
not the profit of the proprietors. The profit to the proprietors is
a mere mode of compensating them for their outlay of capital in
providing and keeping up, this public easement.
A franchise for the railroad, which the defendant was accused of
obstructing, had been duly granted to the proprietors, which grant
included the right to lay down tracks on a public highway, and
also to use and maintain horse cars thereon for the carriage of
passengers.
Every grant, by an obvious and familiar rule of law, carries with
it all incidental rights and powers, necessary to the full use and
beneficial enjoyment of the grant; and when such grant has for its
object the procurement of an easement for the public, the incidental
powers must be so construed as most effectually to secure to the
public the full enjoyment of such easement.
It appears that the proprietors of the horse railroad, having received a franchise, had laid down a railway track, and had procured
horse cars, with suitable conductors, and were in the actual use of
the track. The defendant, with a heavily loaded team,-it does
not appear whether an ox team or horse team,-was on the public
street driving from Charlestown to Boston, with one of his wheels
on the railroad track, when the cars came up behind him. The
defendant's team was moving at the usual rate for teams of that
class, but at a less rate of speed than the cars were in the habit of
moving. There was room outside the track fo either vehicle to
pass the other. When the cars came up, the conductor asked the
defendant if he would remove his team from the track; he did not,
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but continued upon it, at the same rate of speed, several hundred
feet, and then turned off.
Several things are here to be observed. The cars could only
pass on one precise line. The wagon could deviate to the right or
to the left, within the limits of the travelled part of the road. The
public, by the grant of the franchise, had granted the right to move
on that precise line, and had given to all passengers the right to
be carried on that line at the usual rate of speed at which passengers
are carried by horses, subject only to occasional necessary impediments. The cars cannot so move, and the passengers cannot be so
carried, whilst the wagon moves on the track. No impediment is
shown to prevent the wagon from turning out. The wagon, therefore, is, for the time being, an unnecessary obstruction of the public
travel, and therefore unlawful.
It is stated among the above-mentioned circumstances in the bill
of exceptions, as if the two vehicles were upon an equality in this
respect, that there was room on either side for either vehicle to
turn out. But this is mere illusion; the wagon could turn out, the
cars could not; ad impossibilia lex non cogit.
It is said, above, that it is usual for those in charge of heavy and
slow teams to drive them with one wheel on the track, and that
they could be driven much more easily in that place than in any
other part of the street. This is no justification. Whilst the track
was not required for the cars, perhaps the teamster had a right so
to use it. But, when required for the cars, which could pass in no
other mode, he had no legal right to consult his own convenience,
to the great inconvenience, the actual injury of the equal rights of
another.
It is no excuse that the defendant did not get upon the track in
the first instance with the intention of obstructing the passage of
the cars, or that he did not slacken his rate of speed on their approach; it is a nuisance, if, for his own benefit, he violates the
rights of others; and if this consists in the violation of a public
right, indictment is the appropriate remedy for its vindication and
redress. Nor is express malice, a disposition or desire to cause
damage to another, as in case of malicious mischief, necessary to
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the completion of the offence. It is a nuisance if one wilfully seeks
and pursues his own private advantage, regardless of the rights of
others, and in plain violation of them; it is a wrong done. And
as every man must be presumed to intend all the necessary natural
and oidinary consequences of his own acts, it is a wilful and intended wrong; it is malice,-a thing done malo animo,-in the
sense of the law; and no other malice need be proved, to show the
act to be a nuisance.
If it be said that the obstruction in this case was very slight,
that the cars were delayed but a very short time,-the answer is,
that this is very true, and the injury may be trifling in itself, but
vindicated and justified as it is in the argument, on the ground of
right, it tests a principle of-very great importance. If the driver
of a heavily loaded truck or wagon may, for his personal convenience, use one rail of the track, wilfully, for a few hundred feet,others may use the other rail for the like purpose, and for any
distance which suits their convenience. Cars which, at the ordinary
speed of horses in carriages, would pass a given space in one hour,
may be three or four in accomplishing it.. Passengers whose business requires them to be at the place of destination at a fixed time,
and who expect and have a right to expect that it will be reached
in that time, may find their business greatly deranged. Men who,
relying on the establishment of horse-cars for their daily passage,
have fixed their domicil in one place and their ordinary place of
business in another, may find their plans of life thus defeated.
Indeed, without pursuing the effect of the right contended for into
all its consequences, the establishment of such a principle might
essentially impair the value of real estate in many situations.
We will now consider some of the points specially raised by the
bill of exceptions.
1. The defendant contended that malice must be shown, and that
it could not be inferred from the mere fact that the defendant used
a part of the street, the most convenient to him, in the ordinary
way, knowing that the car would be obstructed by such use.
If the term malice is here used in the sense of ill-will, a desire to
injure another, as an actuating motive, the opinion of the court is,
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that malice need not be shown, but that, if a wilful intent to follow
his own convenience in violation of the equal rights of others, exist,
it is sufficient, and no other malicious motive need be proved.
2. The defendant contended, that in the absence of regulations
on the subject, the corporation has no right to drive its cars at any
particular rate of speed, and the mere slacking of the speed of the
car by the defendant, if he was moving at the ordinary and proper
rate of speed, was no obstruction within the meaning of the statute.
This position we think is untenable. We think the corporation
had a right, and, in reference to passengers, were bound to move
at the rate of speed usual for vehicles for the carriage of passengers
drawn by horses, provided this right could be enjoyed without preventing the loaded team from moving at its usual and proper speed;
and both could be done by the team ahead turning off the track,
which the car in the rear could not do. It was therefore the duty
of the team, in the reasonable use of the public right, to do it.
What was the usual and proper rate of speed of the one was not
that of the other.
3. The evidence was properly left to the jury.
4. It was contended, that the right of the horse railroad company
to use the highways is subject to the right of the public to use such
highways, as they have previously done.
This position we think manifestly unsound. The Legislature having granted a new and peculiar use of the highways, the right of
the public to use them-as they had done is thereby qualified, and
must be adapted to such new use.
Suppose the Legislature should authorize a canal to cross a highway, with a draw, to be raised while boats are passing; the public
cannot use the highway, as they have previously done, at all times,
but must use it in subordination to the new right granted.
So here, the law having authorized a horse railroad, which cannot
deviate from one line, other vehicles must conform their use of the
way to such new and authorized use, although it prevents them, to
some extent, from using it as they had previously done.
The 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th prayers for instructions, we think,
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were rightly rejected, for reasons which are already sufficiently
stated.
The instructions actually given were, in our opinion, correct in
law, carefully guarded, and precisely adapted to the circumstances
of the case, and therefore the exceptions must be overruled, and
judgment entered on the verdict.

In the Supreme JudicialCourt of Massachusetts, September Term,
1859.
DANA H. FITCH AND OTHERS vs. SAMUEL P. HARRINGTON AND OTHERS.,
1. An agreement between one partner and a third person, that the latter shall
participate in that partner's share of the profits of the firm, as profits, renders
him liable as a partner to the creditors of the firm, although, as regards the
other members of the firm, he is not their copartner.
2. The acts and declaration, of a person not a partner are not admissible to charge
him as a partner, without showing that they were brought home to the plaintiff's
knowledge.

Action on a promissory note signed by the name of Whittemore,
Harrington & Co. Trial before METCALF, J., who signed this bill
of exceptions :
"Samuel P. Harrington alone made defence; and the only
question was, whether he was liable, as a partner, with the other
defendants.
"It was in evidence that the firm of Whittemore, Harrington &
Co. was formed in July 1856, and carried on business until the
latter part of October 1857, when they stopped payment; and that
the notes in suit were given for articles used in the business of the
firm.
"The plaintiffs introduced evidence tending to show that Samuel
P. Harrington was a member of said firm, as between the partners
themselves; that the share in the concern, standing in the name of
Leonard Harrington (one of the members of the firm) was owned
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jointly by Leonard and Samuel P. Harrington; that Samuel P.
held himself out to the plaintiffs, expressly, and also to the public
at large, as one of the partners in the firm ; and that the plaintiffs
gave credit to Whittemore, Harrington & Co., under the belief that
he was a partner.
",The defendant, Samuel P. Harrington, introduced evidence,
tending to show that he was not a partner in the firm ; that he had
not held himself out as such to the public at large, nor to the
plaintiffs; that he had no interest in the share of the concern
standing in the name of Leonard Harrington; and that he was not
known nor recognized as a partner by the members of the firm.
"The plaintiffs requested the court to instruct the jury, that
although Samuel P. Harrington was not known by the members of
the firm generally, to be a partner, yet if the share in the partnership concern, which share stood in the name of Leonard Harrington
only, was owned jointly by Leonard and Samuel P., and Samuel P.,
a3 between him and Leonard, was entitled to the profits, if any,
which might be derived from that share, he (Samuel P.) was a
partner in the firm, as to the plaintiffs, and liable to them in this
action; that if he held himself out as a partner in the firm, under
such circumstances as to induce the plaintiffs to give credit to the
firm under that belief, though he was not in reality a partner, he
was still liable to them as such; and that his acts and declarations,
if made publicly, though not brought to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, were competent evidence that he so held himself out, and
thereby induced the plaintiffs to give credit to the firm, under the
belief that he was a partner.
"The court declined to give instructions in the terms requested;
but instructed the jury as follows: That if Samuel P. Harrington
was a member of the firm, when the notes in suit were given, he
was liable in this action, whether the plaintiffs then knew or did not
know that he was a partner, or whether they did or did not give
credit to the firm on the belief that lie was a partner; that if he was
not a member of the firm, yet, if by his acts and declarations, which
were brought home to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, he led them
to believe that he was a member of the firm, and to give credit to
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the firm in that belief, he was liable to them in this action ; that
his acts and declarations to persons other than the plaintiffs were
evidence for the jury to consider, in determining the question
whether he was a member of the firm ; but if such acts and
declarations did not satisfy the jury that he was a member of the
firm, then they were not evidence which would render him liable to
the plaintiffs, unless knowledge of them was brought home to the
plaintiffs, and induced them to give credit to the firm in the belief
that he was a member of the firm; that if the share in the partner-.
ship concern, which share stood in the name of Leonard Harrington
only, was owned jointly by him and Samuel P. Harrington, then
Samuel P. was liable in this action; but if there was a sub-partnership between Leonard and Samuel P., by which Samuel P. was to
share in the profits of the firm, to which profits Leonard was
entitled, this alone would not make Samuel P. liable for the debts
of the firm.
"The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiffs
excepted to the instructions given to the jury."
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-We are all of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled
to a new trial, for the reason that the instruction respecting a subpartnership between Leonard Harrington and Samuel P. Harrington, given, as it was, without any explanation, may have misled the
jury. - That part of the instructions was given on the authority of
Collyer on Partnership, (3d ed.) § 194, which was cited by the
defendants' counsel at so late a stage of the trial, that the court had
no opportunity to examine the position there laid down, which is
thus: "Although the deleetus personw, which is inherent in the
nature of partnership, precludes the introduction of a stranger
against the will of any of the copartners, yet no partner is precluded from entering into a sub-partnership with a stranger; nam
80oii mei 80Ciu8, Meus 8soU8 'non est. In such case, the stranger
may share the profits of the particular partner with whom he contracts, and, not being engaged to the general partnership, will of
course not be liable for their debts."
METCALF,
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The only *decided cases which Mr. Collyer cites, in support of
this position, are that of Sir Charles Baymond, referred to by
Lord Eldon, in Ex parte Barrow, 2 Rose, 255, and that of Brown
vs. De Tastet, Jac. 284. In the case in 2 Rose, Lord Eldon said:
"I take it to have been long since clearly established, that a man
may become a partner with A., where A. and B. are partners, and
yet not be a member of that partnership which existed between A.
and B. In the case of Sir Charles Raymond, a banker in the city,
a Mr. Fletcher agreed with Sir Charles Raymond, that he should
be interested so far as to receive a share of his profits of the business, and which share he had a right to draw out from the-firm of
Raymond & Co. But it was held, that he was no partner in that
partnership, had no demand against it, had no account in it, and
that he must be satisfied with a share of the profits arising and
given to Sir Charles Raymond." In the case in Jacob, it was
decided, that where one of several partners had agreed with a third
person to give him a moiety of his share in the concern, the court
of chancery might decree an account between them, without making
the other partners parties to the bill. These cases show this only:
That as between the members of the firm, inter sese, Mr. Fletcher,
in the first case, and the third person in the other case, were not
copartners. They decided nothing as to the liability of either of
them to the creditors of the existing firm.
But Mr. Collyer also cites 2 Bell Com. 636, where it is said;
" There may be a sub-contract, by which a stranger may be admitted
to divide with any of the partners his share of the profits. The
other partners are not bound to take notice of this sub-contract ;
nor is there any responsibility attached to it, by which the stranger,
as sharing in the profit of the concern, becomes liable for the debts
of the partnership." Erskine's Institutes, and the case of Fairholm vs. Majoribanks, decided in Scotland in 1725, are cited in
support of this position. In looking at 3 Ersk. Inst. (ed. of 1828,)
§§ 21, 22, we find that nothing is there said concerning the liability
of such stranger for the debts of the partnership. Mr. Erskine
says, "if any of the partners shall assume a third person into partnership with him, such assumed person becomes partner, not to the
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company, but to the assumer." We have not seen the report of
Fairhoim vs. Majoribanks. But Mr. Stark cites that case and
Erskine's Institutes, in support of the following passage in his work
on partnership : " Sub-contracts between partners and other persons,' by which a beneficial interest in the partnership is granted, do
not create new partners. The partner himself remains alone liable
to company creditors." He adds a quotation from the Digest,
which is silent, however, as to such other persons' liability for the
debts of the partnership. Stark on Part. 155. It would seem, therefore, that the Scotch writers, Mr. Bell and Mr. Stark, have stated
the doctrine which Mr. Collyer has repeated, only as an inference
of their own from the established law, that such a sub-contract as
those writers mention, between one member of a firm and a stranger, does not make the stranger, as between him and the firm, their
copartner; and hence that the law of Scotland, as to such stranger's
liability for the debts of the firm, may not differ from the law of
England and of this country. Indeed, it is hardly to be supposed
that it was decided in Pairholm vs. Ma.Ioribanks, that such a stranger was not liable for the debts of the firm in a case in which, by the
English law and ours, he would have been liable. For both Mr. Bell
and Mr. Stark, as well as Mr. Collyer, correctly state the English law
on this point, without an intimation that the Scotch law is different,
except by subsequently inserting the passage which the defendants'
counsel cited at the trial of the present case. 2 Bell Com. 625,
626, Stark on Part. 137 & seq. Collyer on Part. book 1. c. 1.
Now, what is our law and the law of England on this subject?
We understand it to be thus: An agreement between one copartner
and a third person, that he shall participate in the profits of the
firm, as profits, renders him liable, as a partner, to the creditors of
the firm, although, as between himself and the members of the firm,
be is not their copartner; but if such third. person, by his agreement with one member of the firm, is to receive compensation for
his labor, services, &c., in proportion to the profits of the business
of the firm, without having any specific lien on the profits, to the
exclusion of other creditors, he is not liable for the debts of the
firm. .Denny vs. Cabot, 6 Met. 90-94. Bradley vs. White, 10
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Met. 305. Holmes vs. Old Colony Railroad,5 Gray, 58. Burckle
vs. Echart, 3 Comst. 132. 3 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 33 &seq. Parsons' Mere. Law, 168, and note.
In order to enable the jury to decide whether Samuel P. Harrington was liable for the debts of the firm of Whittemore, Harrington & Co. by reason of a sub-partnership between him and
Leonard Harrington, they should have received instructions more
definite and discriminating than they could derive from the mere
words of Mr. Collyer. The kind of agreement which would render
Samuel P. liable for the debts of the firm, and the kind of agreemeut which would not render him liable therefor, should have been
so explained to them that they might intelligently decide whether
the agreement between the two (if any was proved) was such as did
or did not render Samuel P. liable as a partner, for the debts due
from the firm to the plaintiffs.
The other instructions given to the jury seem to us to have been
New trialgranted.
unexceptionable.

In the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.-July 10, 1860.
SIMON MILLS, RESPONDENT,

agaitst

EZRA

r. GLEASON, TREASURER &c.,

APPELLANT.

1. The City of Madison, beforle the publication of its charter, issued certain bonds,
and subsequently levied and collected a tax to pay the interest on such bonds,
and paid it to the holders of the bonds; held, that this was such a ratification of

the bonds as would bind the city, provided it would have been bound if the
charter had been in force at the time the bonds were issued.
2. No special act and no express provision in a charter is required to enable a city
to borrow money for purposes clearly municipal.
3. The kind and character of irregularities in tax assessments which invalidate
them.

Abbott and Clark, for respondent.
S. U. Pinney, for appellant.
Appeal from Dane County Court.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
PAINE, J.-In the case of Clark vs. The City of Tanesville, the
majority of the court held that the charter of that city was a public
and therefore a general law, within the meaning of the constitutional
provision, that no general law should be in force until published.
The charter of the city of Madison was not published until after
the issue of the bonds whose validity is questioned in this suit, and
the case would therefore be governed by that decision, unless as is
claimed on the other side, the city after it did acquire an existence
as such by the publication of the charter, did some act ratifying the
issue of the bonds so as to bind itself. This ground of objection is
one of a technical character, and although it must prevail where the
case comes within it, yet'a stronger case could not well be presented
for applying the doctrine that a subsequent ratification will render
valid acts that in point of strict law were unauthorized when they
were done; and this is a familiar rule in the case of individuals. If a
man without any authority assumes to act as the agent of another,
although the act, as to the other, is of no validity, yet if he subsequently ratifies it, and adopts it, and receives the benefit of it, he is
as much bound as though he had authorized it in the first instance.
And we think this-principle applicable to this case. Here everything was done, necessary to authorize the issuing of the bonds,
except the publication of the charter, all the parties however supposing it to be in force. If after it was in force the city received
the proceeds, and appropriated them to its use, and recognized the
validity of these bonds, we could not well imagine a case more fit
far the application of this rule. And we think the following authorities fully justify its application. Charitable Society vs. Episcopal
Church in Dedham, 1 Pick. 372; Edwards vs. The Grand Junction
Railway Co., 7 Sim. 85, and Goody vs. Railway Company, 16 E.
L. and Eq. 596. In the last case the Master of the Rolls, referring
to the previous cases, says that they "establish the principle that
whenever a third party enters into a contract with the plaintiff, and
the defendant takes the benefit of it, he is bound to give the plaintiff
the advantage he has contracted for." Upon looking into the cases
it will be seen that the rule was established upon these facts. The
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projectors of a railway company had made contracts prior to its
organization, which the company when organized received the benefit
of. And it was held that they thereby became bound by the contract. The facts in this case are similar in character, or if anything,
stronger in favor of the rule, for here the parties all acted in the full
belief that the charter was in force.
It appears from the evidence that the proceeds of the bonds went
into the treasury of the city, and were expended by it, and that
after the charter was in force, their validity was recognized by levying a tax for the payment of the interest. We think this ratifies
them and binds the city, provided it would have been bound, if the
charter had been in force at the time they were issued.
But it is claimed that the city had no power to make this loan or
issue its bonds therefor. There is no special act and no provision
in its charter expressly authorizing it, and it was said that without
this, the power to borrow money did not exist, and could not be
claimed as incidental to the execution of the general powers granted
by the charter. The charter does confer the power to purchase fire
apparatus, cemetery grounds etc., to establish markets, and to do
many other things, for the execution of which money would be
necessary as a means. It would seem, therefore, that in the absence
of any restriction, the power to borrow money would pass as an
incident to the execution of these general powers, according to the
well settled rule that corporations may resort to usual and convenient means of executing the powers granted, for certainly no means
is more usual for the execution of such objects, than that of borrowing money. But an argument against the right is derived from the
practice which has prevailed to a considerable extent, of obtaining
special acts of the legislature, authorizing the procurement of loans
by municipal corporations and the issuing of bonds or other securities in payment.
We are not aware to what extent, if any, this practice has prevailed in this State, as to loans for purposes clearly municipal, and
authorized by the charter ; but it seems to have been resorted to
sometimes even in such cases in other States. The argument drawn
from the assumption on the part of the legislature of the necessity
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of such acts, is one always entitled to consideration, and sometimes
of much weight, though never conclusive; and we think, owing to
the peculiar nature of the subject matter, that in cases involving a
loan by corporations, it is of less force than in almost any other, for
capital'is of a timid, jealous disposition. It delights in certainty,
and is alarmed by doubts. It has been held with great strictness
that corporations can exercise no powers except those granted by
their charter. When, therefore, the charter does not expressly
give the power of borrowing money, even though it grants powers
to which this might be claimed as incident, yet there is room for
doubt, a chance for an argument, and that being so, it might, as a
matter of policy, facilitate the loan by removing all uncertainty by
an express act of the legislature. And the fact that such acts have
been passed, being then clearly necessary when these corporations
have been authorized to issue bonds in aid of purposes outside of
their charters, may have had a tendency to induce a resort to the
same practice when the bonds were issued for some purpose authorized by the charter, though in that case such legislation may not
have been necessary. For these reasons we think there is nothing
in this practice sufficient to overthrow the general rule, that in the
absence of restrictions, a corporation authorized to contract debts
and to execute undertakings requiring money, may borrow money
for those purposes and issue its bonds or other obligations therefor.
This question is alluded to in Ketchnm vs. The city of Buffalo,
4 Kern.'356, and the court held that the fact that in several other
instances, the legislature had expressly granted power to corporations
to "purchase market lots," did not justify the conclusion that the
city of Buffalo could not exercise the power as incidental to the
general power of establishing a market. The court held that under
that general power, it might purchase the lot on credit and issue
its bonds in payment. And, after carefully considering the suggestions made by the learned judge who delivered the opinion, we fail
to perceive any substantial distinction, so far as the question of power
is concerned, between the method there adopted and that adopted
by the city of Madison in this case. True, it is there suggested
that the question whether the city of Buffalo could have borrowed
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the money, and paid for the lot and issued its bond for the money,
was a different question, though at first view "they might seem
identical." But on examining the points of distinction stated, we
think they do not affect the question of power, but simply go to show
that the one method of exercising it may afford less facility for a
misapplication of the funds than the other. Thus it was said that
if the money was borrowed to build a market it might be used to
build a theatre, whereas if the contract were directly for the market
and the bond given in payment, it would ensure the application of
the fund to its legitimate object. This might be a good reason why
the legislature should restrict the corporation to the one method of
accomplishing the object. But when the power is granted without
restriction as to the-means, it does not in our opinion justify a court
in saying, that while the corporation has the power of using one
means, it has not that of using another, though equally direct and
well adapted to the accomplishment of the object, provided the funds
are honestly applied, merely because it may afford greater facility
for a misapplication. They might undoubtedly be misapplied in
either case. Thus what should prevent the city of Buffalo, having
purchased a lot for a market and given its bonds for it, from erecting a theatre instead of a market on the lot, if it was to be assumed
that it was willing to pervert its funds and its credit to unauthorized
purposes ? Or, having purchased materials for a market, it might,
out of them erect a theatre. Or, having given its bond for the purchase of a lot and the erection of a market, and then having raised
by taxation the money to pay the bond, it might use the money to
build the theatre, leaving the bond unpaid. This opportunity of
misapplying the funds must exist under any method of executing
the powers of a corporation. If one affords greater facility for it
than another, the remedy is in restrictions by the legislature, and
the selections of honest and capable agents by the people. But it
affords no ground for a court to say that as a mere question of power,
the corporation may not adopt the one method as well as the other,
and it being established that a corporation may purchase upon credit,
such things as are necessary for the execution of its powers, we think
it follows necessarily that it may borrow the money to pay for them,
as that is one mode of purchasing upon credit.
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Nor is the power of taxation conferred by the charter to be
deemed to exclude the power of borrowing money. The case just
referred to is an authority against such a proposition. It holds
that, notwithstanding the power of taxation, the corporation may
resort to its credit, not only for its ordinary current expenses, but
for objects of a permanent character. The case of Olark vs. School
-District,3 R. I., 199, is also in point. It was there held that a
school district might borrow money to pay debts contracted for the
erection of a school house, and give its note therefor, and that its
power of taxation was not to be construed as forbidding it to borrow money for a legitimate purpose. Beers vs. Phceniz Glass CJo.,
14 Barb. 858, and Hfead vs. Keeler, 24 Barb. 29, are also direct
authorities in favor of the power of a corporation to borrow money,
as incidental to the execution of its other powers. It was said on
the argument that it did not appear that the moneys received were
all applied to municipal purposes. it does not appear how they
were all applied, but we apprehend it would not be incumbent on
the lender to show that they were properly applied. If the city
had power to borrow money for legitimate purposes, a misapplication of the funds after they were obtained would not invalidate the
contract. In Bigelow vs. The City of Perth Amboy, 1 Dutch.
(N. J.) 297, the city had purchased a quantity of flag-stone for
paving streets, and it was claimed that the charter had not been
complied with, in respect to the proceedings preliminary to the
paving by the city. But the court held that to be a question
between the city and the lot owners, and they add: "But as between the creditors of the city and the corporation, the only question is whether the city agents, the mayor and council, had the
power of purchasing the material in question. How the material
was used, or whether it was used at all, is to the creditor a matter of
total indifference." So in a recent case in England, Eastern
Counties B. B. Co. vs. Hawkes, 38 E. L., and Eq. 8, it was held
that where the charter allowed the company to purchase lands for
extraordinary purposes, a person contracting to sell them land
was not bound to see that it was strictly required for such purposes, and that if he acted in good faith, without knowing of any

MILLS vs. GLEASON.

intention to misapply the funds of the company, he might enforce
the contract.
The principle of that decision would seem to warrant the proposition that where a corporation has power to borrow money, a
lender acting in good faith, and supposing it to be borrowed for
legitimate purposes, might recover, even though the corporation
intended to devote it to objects unauthorized. And it would certainly sustain the position that where it was borrowed for lawful
objects, no subsequent misapplication of the funds could affect the
rights of the lender, about which there is in fact no room even for
the shadow of a doubt.
But it was objected that the tax was not levied by a two-thirds
vote as the charter requires. It was levied by a two-thirds vote of
the 9ldermen, but not of the council, including the mayor. The
charter provides that the "Common Council shall consist of the
mayor and aldermen," &c. It provides that a vote to levy a tax
shall .be passed by two-thirds of the "members elect," and it is
said that the mayor should be counted in making up the number,
of which the two-thirds is requisite. But we think this provision
relates to the aldermen only. They are elected as members of the
council and as nothing else, they act and vote on all questions;
'while the mayor, although he is made by the charter one of the
constituent parts of the council, yet he is so in the same sense that
the Vice-President is a part of the United States Senate, or the
Lieutenant-Governor.a part of the Senate of the State. We think
he was not intended to be counted in the provision for a twothirds vote.
It is also objected that the assessors did not meet for the purpose
of hearing objections, as required by the charter. We are unable
to say from the evidence that this objection is true in point of fact.
It appears from the evidence on both sides that the assessors did
meet, and the most that can be said is, that it does not appear that
they were all present at any one time. We shall not attempt to
determine what would be the effect of an entire omission of this
meeting by the assessors. It is undoubtedly a matter of much
difficulty bath upon principle and upon authority, to determine
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with what degree of strictness the directions of the statute in regard
to taxation, must be followed, in order to prevent the entire tax
from being illegal. On the one hand is the evil of illegal and
oppressive taxation upon the citizen, and on the other the danger
of defehting entirely the collection of the public revenue, by the
neglect or omissions of the officers to -whom it is entrusted. Perhaps the only method of solving the difficulty would be to hold that
no objection which did not go to the very ground-work of the tax,
so as to affect materially its principle, and show it must necessarily
be illegal, ought to have the effect of rendering the whole invalid;
and there are some authorities, which even hold that such an objection would not, though in the case of Weeks vs. Milwaukee, this
court gave it that effect. But when the objection is a mere noncompliance with some direction of the statute, notwithstanding
which the tax may have been entirely just or equal, it ought not to
have that effect. If it did, the collection of taxes would be rendered practically impossible. In such cases the remedy must be
for each one to obtain such special relief as the laws may furnish
on showing the omission, and that he was aggrieved by it.
And this disposes of the objection now uhder consideration, and
also of the one that the tax list was not returned to the county
treasurer within the time required by law. Neither of them necessarily impeach the justice of the tax, and there is nothing in the
case to show that the complainant was specially aggrieved by either.
And we do not think he can sustain a suit in equity to enjoin the
collection of a tax legal and just in itself, merely on account of
such irregularities.
We will notice but one other objection, which might properly
have been noticed before. It is said that the cemetery bonds were
issued in violation of law. And it appears that by see. 3, chap.
104, Private and Local Laws of 1857, the city was prohibited from
issuing, selling or disposing of any bonds, except those specially
authorized for the enlargement of the capitol. It might be here
noticed that this statute turns the argument to be derived from the
understanding of the legislature, in favor of the existence of the
power previously. For passing the act to prohibit it, implies that

